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BUCKNER QUOTING GOLDSTEIN AND DAVIDSON ON 
QUOTATION 
By J. VAN BRAKEL 
IN (Goldstein on quotation, ANALYSIS 44.4, October 1984, pp. 
189-90), Buckner concludes that the demonstrative account of 
quotation is wrong because it is fundamental to the demonstrative 
account that the 'quoted'sample is not read. In a case like Buckner's 
sentence (4): 
(A) The word 'Kuznetzin' denotes the former Russian 
ambassador 
we DO read the 'Kuznetzin' and without it the sentence does not 
have the required sense. (Everything that is printed in italics I quote 
from Buckner's note just mentioned.) Hence, according to Buckner, 
the demonstrative account must be wrong. 
This is a gross misrepresentation of the demonstrative account. 
Nowhere is it said, by either Goldstein or Davidson, that we do not 
read the 'quoted'sample. Buckner quotes Goldstein saying that one 
can think of....quotation marks as arrows pointing to a sample 
which COULD be remote from the sentence; and he quotes Davidson 
saying that we COULD easily enough remove the quoted material 
from the heart of the sentence (my emphasis in both cases). As 
Buckner shows himself (his sentences (2) and (3)), my sentence (A) 
(his (4)) can be easily rephrased, without changing the sense, so that 
the word 
(B) Kuznetzin 
is not read as part of the sentence. For example, instead of (A), 
I can say: 
(C) the word (B) denotes the former Russian ambassador 
However, whatever device we use to communicate something about 
the word (B), the sense of what is to be communicated is only 
obtained by the reader or listener if he has examined a token of (B). 
Buckner puts much emphasis on the fact that first we read the 
quoted material; THEN we look back to examine it (his emphasis). 
If I guess Buckner's intended meaning correctly, this would seem 
to be rather trivial: we can only start examining something after we 
have received the instruction or suggestion to do that and hence we 
have to read at least as far as the second quotation mark in (A), 
before we can start examining. If I go by the literal meaning of 
what Buckner says, it would seem that he misinterprets (A), because 
he says that if we bracket off the quoted word in (A), then we must 
read: 
(D) The word denotes the former Russian ambassador 
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74 ANALYSIS 
which does not make a great deal of sense. But (D) is not the way 
we must read (A); neither on the demonstrative account, nor on 
any other sensible account. If we consider the quotation marks 
themselves as bracketing-off devices, the subject of (A) functions as 
an indexical description pointing to a part of itself. A similar situa- 
tion arises in a phrase such as: 
(E) the second word of this indexical description 
where the reference of (E) is the second word of (E). On the other 
hand, if we take Davidson's suggestion that we can remove the 
quoted material from the sentence literally (which is what Buckner 
seems to suggest), then (A) does not reduce to (D), but to 
(F) The word '... 'denotes the former Russian ambassador 
which on Buckner's own account is a perfectly sensible thing to 
read, because it is only after examining the quoted material that we 
might become suspicious with respect to the factual meaning of (F). 
Of course Davidson does not mean that we can just cut the 
quoted material from the sentence and leave it at that. What is 
meant is that we could easily remove the quoted material from the 
heart of the sentence by rephrasing the sentence (for example (A) 
to (C)), perhaps even adding a sentence. And this we can always 
do. Quotation marks can always be eliminated by using some other 
conventions that serve the same goal. (But this is not the case the 
other way round. In the sentence 
(G) (G) is not true 
it is not possible to use quotation marks to name (G) and this 
simple fact has caused a whole stream of literature trying to make 
sense of Tarski's muddled presentation of the paradox of the liar.) 
I conclude therefore that Buckner's criticism of the demonstra- 
tive account of quotation marks is misdirected and his positive 
conclusion that whether or not we EXAMINE the quoted word, 
we must first of all read it, is trivial and might suggest, incorrectly, 
that before examining it we would know what the sentence means. 
Much of the discussion about various accounts of quotation 
marks suffers from the worn out fallacy that tokens of the same 
sign (for example quotation marks) should have the same meaning 
in every context where they occur. Quotation marks have been put 
to various uses: to mention an expression, to display an expression, 
to mention and use an expression, to indicate that an expression 
which is used has been copied from another source, to use an 
expression in a metaphorical way, and so on. Each use asks for its 
own analysis and not, a priori, for a reduction to one primary use. 
It would be instructive, just for a change, not to use quotation 
marks at all for, say, ten years, and get used to the different uses 
they have been put to by using different devices for each type of 
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use, as I have done in this note. (No quotation marks occur in this 
note except in sentences which I have copied from Buckner's note.) 
State University of Utrecht, 
P. O. Box 80,000, 
3508 TA, Utrecht, Netherlands 
SJ. VAN BRAKEL 1985 
TARSKI A RELATIVIST? 
By HARVEY SIEGEL 
RICHARD C. Jennings ('Popper, Tarski and Relativism', ANALYSIS 43.3, June 1983, pp. 118-23 - all page references are to this 
paper) argues that Popper mistakenly appeals to Tarski's semantic 
conception of truth in order to defend a realist conception of 
science, and that Tarski's analysis actually supports or constitutes 
a form of relativism. In this brief note I will suggest that Jennings 
is right about the first point, but mistaken about the second. 
Jennings correctly and fairly describes Popper's appeal to Tarski 
in his (Popper's) defence of the notion of objective or absolute 
truth. As Jennings points out, Popper takes Tarski's semantic 
conception to be an analysis of the correspondence theory of truth, 
which he (Popper) takes to explicate the relation between state- 
ments and extra-linguistic facts. As Jennings argues, however, the 
semantic conception offers no special access to such extra-linguistic 
facts. Rather, it 'implies no more than that whenever a sentence 
such as "snow is white" is asserted or rejected we must be ready to 
assert or reject the correlated sentence, "the sentence 'snow is 
white' is true"' (p. 121). What correspond on the semantic concep- 
tion are sentences in the object-language and sentences in the 
meta-language, not sentences and extra-linguistic facts. The semantic 
conception does not, and is not intended by Tarski to, 'establish the 
conditions under which we are warranted in asserting any given 
(empirical) sentence' (p. 121). Thus Popper is mistaken in interpret- 
ing Tarski's semantic conception as explicating the relation between 
sentences and extra-linguistic facts. That conception, rather, is 
neutral as between alternative epistemological stances with respect 
to that relation: as Tarski says, ' ... we may accept the semantic 
conception of truth without giving up any epistemological attitude 
we may have had; we may remain naive realists, critical realists or 
idealists, empiricists or metaphysicians - whatever we were before. 
The semantic conception is completely neutral toward all these 
issues' (quoted by Jennings, pp. 121-2). Thus Popper is mistaken in 
taking Tarski's conception as supporting or justifying scientific 
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